




Banco de Portugal, Universidade Catolica Portuguesa and CEPR
Pedro Teles†
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, CEPR.
First draft: June, 2000
This version: December, 2001
Abstract
In this paper, we derive principles of optimal cyclical monetary policy
in an economy without capital, with a cash-in-advance restriction on house-
hold transactions, and with monopolistic ﬁrms that set prices one period in
advance. The only distortionary policy instruments are the nominal inter-
est rate and the money supply. In this environment, it is feasible to undo
both the cash in advance and the price setting restrictions, but not the
monopolistic competition distortion. We show that it is optimal to follow
the Friedman rule, and thus oﬀset the cash-in-advance restriction. We also
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Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.ﬁnd that, in general, it is not optimal to undo the price setting restriction.
Sticky prices provide the planner with tools to improve upon a distorted
ﬂexible prices allocation.
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1. Introduction
In this paper, we derive general principles on how to conduct short-run monetary
policy, by analyzing a real business cycles model without capital, to which three
main restrictions are added: monopolistic ﬁrms, a cash-in-advance restriction on
household transactions, and a restriction on ﬁrms that prices must be set one
period in advance. In this sticky price environment, monetary policy can aﬀect
allocations both through the path of the nominal interest rate and the path of
the money supply. These are the only distortionary policy instruments that the
g o v e r n m e n tc a nu s e . I na d d i t i o nt h eg o v e r n m e n tc a nr a i s el u m ps u mt a x e st o
ﬁnance exogenous public expenditures.
In this environment, it is possible to conduct money supply policy in order to
undo the restriction of price stickiness, so that the allocations under sticky and
ﬂexible prices coincide. By setting the nominal interest rate to zero, the eﬀect of
the cash-in-advance restriction can also be eliminated. However, with the available
policy instruments, because of the zero bound on the nominal interest rate, the
mark-up distortion cannot be removed.
We ﬁrst show that the optimal monetary policy includes setting the nominal
interest rate to zero, i.e. following the Friedman rule. That is a robust result
and thus extends the result in Ireland (1996). The major ﬁnding of the paper,
though, is that in general it is not optimal to completely undo the eﬀects of price
stickiness. Optimal rules in this environment require the sticky price allocation to
deviate from that of the ﬂexible price. Thus, the policy that maximizes welfare,
and similarly would minimize the Harberger triangles, does not close gaps.1 Sticky
prices provide the planner with policy tools to improve upon a distorted ﬂexible
price allocation.
1As is common in this literature, gaps are deﬁned as the deviations between the ﬂexible price
and the sticky price allocations.
2Under ﬂexible prices, only the interest rate matters. The optimal monetary
policy is to set the nominal interest rate to zero. That way the wedge between the
marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of transformation is minimized
in each date and state, and expected utility is maximized. The optimal allocation
will be distorted by a constant mark-up.
Under sticky prices, it is also optimal to set the nominal interest rate to zero,
and it is still the case that under particular conditions on preferences, technology,
and the nature of shocks, constant markups are optimal. However, in general,
the optimal allocation under sticky prices will be characterized by variable mark-
ups. These variable proportionate wedges cannot be attained under ﬂexible prices
because the nominal interest rate cannot be negative. Under sticky prices, the
planner is able to use money supply policy to side-step the zero bound restriction
on the nominal interest rate and achieve higher utility.
The literature on optimal monetary policy in an imperfectly competitive and
sticky price world is relatively recent. Papers related to the current analysis
include Ireland (1996), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998a and1998b), King and Wol-
man (1998), Goodfriend and King (1997, 2000), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997,
1999), Kahn, King and Wolman (2000), Gali and Monacelli (1999), Erceg et al.
(2000).
Our analysis builds on the work by Ireland (1996), Goodfriend and King
(1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998a and1998b), and Adão, Correia and Teles
(1999). Our approach is in many ways orthogonal to the one in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997, 1999), Gali and Monacelli (1999) and Erceg et al (2000). These
papers analyze an environment with a basic structure similar to ours, but with
three main diﬀerences. They allow for ﬁscal instruments that undo the monop-
olistic competition distortion; the economies are cashless; and prices are set in
a staggered fashion. The nominal rigidities are the only distortions so that the
ﬂexible price allocation, if feasible, is optimal.
King and Wolman (1998) study a model with staggered price setting, keep the
monopolistic competition distortion but remove the nominal interest rate distor-
tion by allowing for interest to be paid on currency. They show that the ﬂexible
price solution is optimal in the deterministic case. Kahn, King and Wolman (2000)
allow for the money demand distortion and solve the optimal policy problem nu-
merically. They show that the optimal allocation is quantitatively close to the
ﬂexible price allocation. Goodfriend and King (2000) analyze the case of a small
open economy and discuss the analogy between the optimal monetary policy under
sticky prices and the optimal taxation problem under ﬂexible prices.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the model, deﬁne the equilibria under ﬂexible and sticky prices, and describe how
monetary policy aﬀects the equilibria in the two environments. In Section 3,w e
deﬁne the planner’s problem in the economy with sticky prices. We then determine
the optimal allocation and policy in two steps. We ﬁrst determine the optimal
interest rate policy. For this policy there are multiple allocations, corresponding
to diﬀerent money supply policies. One of those implementable allocations is the
ﬂexible price allocation. We identify the conditions on preferences, technology and
shocks under which the ﬂexible price allocation solves the planner’s problem. Since
it is unlikely that those conditions are satisﬁed, in general the optimal allocations
in the two environments will diﬀer. The optimal policy under sticky prices achieves
higher utility than under ﬂexible prices. Section 4 contains concluding remarks.
2. The economy
The economy consists of a representative household, a continuum of ﬁrms indexed
by i ∈ [0,1], and a government or central bank. We consider a vector of shocks,
st =[ κt,z t,v t,G t] ∈ St, to preferences, κt, technology, zt,v e l o c i t y ,vt,a n dg o v e r n -
ment expenditures, Gt. The history of these shocks up to period t, (s0,s 1,...,s t),
is denoted by st ∈ St. In order to simplify the exposition, we assume that the
history of shocks has a discrete distribution.
Each ﬁrm produces a distinct, perishable consumption good, indexed by i. The
production uses labor, according to a concave technology.
We impose a cash-in-advance constraint to the households’ transactions with
the timing as in Lucas and Stokey (1983). Each period is divided into two subpe-
riods, with the assets market in the ﬁrst subperiod and the goods market in the
second.
2.1. The households
The households have preferences over composite consumption Ct, and leisure Lt,


















,θ > 1, (2.2)
where ct (i) is the consumption level of good i, and θ is the elasticity of substitution
between any two goods.
Households start period t with nominal wealth Wt. They receive monetary
transfers Xt, decide to hold money, Mt, and to buy Bt nominal bonds that pay
RtBt one period later. Rt is the gross nominal interest rate at date t.T h e ya l s o
buy At+1 units of state contingent nominal securities. Each security pays one unit
of money at the beginning of period t +1in a particular state. Let Qt,t+1 be
the beginning of period t price of these securities normalized by the probability
of the occurrence of the state. Therefore, households spend EtQt,t+1At+1 in state
contingent nominal securities. Thus, in the assets market at the beginning of
period t they face the constraint
Mt + Bt + EtQt,t+1At+1 − At − Xt ≤ Wt. (2.3)
Af r a c t i o n , 1
vt, of the purchases of consumption,
R 1
0 Pt (i)ct (i)di,w h e r ePt (i) is
the price of good i in units of money, must be made with money so that the





Pt (i)ct (i)di ≤ Mt. (2.4)
At the end of the period, the households receive the labor income WtNt, where
Nt =1− Lt is labor and Wt is the nominal wage rate. They also receive the
dividends from the ﬁrms
R 1
0 Πt (i)di, and pay lump sum taxes, Tt.T h u s , t h e
nominal wealth households bring to period t +1is
Wt+1 ≤ Mt + RtBt −
Z 1
0
Pt (i)ct (i)di + WtNt +
Z 1
0
Πt (i)di − Tt. (2.5)
The households’ problem is to maximize expected utility (2.1) subject to the
restrictions (2.2), (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5), together with no-Ponzi games conditions







1−θ. The following are ﬁrst order conditions of this prob-






















































, for all t and s
t. (2.10)
Condition (2.6) deﬁnes the demand for each of the goods i and condition (2.7)
sets the intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between leisure and composite
consumption equal to the real wage adjusted for the cost of using money. The
cost of using money is R0
t =1+1
vt (Rt − 1), since only a fraction of goods, 1
vt,m u s t
be purchased with money. Condition (2.8) is a requirement for the optimal choice
of risk-free nominal bonds. Condition (2.9) determines the price of one unit of
money at time t +1 , for each state of nature st+1, normalized by the conditional
probability of occurrence of state st+1, in units of money at time t.
When vt =1then R0
t = Rt. In this case, our model coincides with the standard,
unitary velocity, cash-in-advance model. As vt →∞ , the cash constraint becomes
irrelevant and the model reduces to a real model. Note that in that case R0
t =1 .
It is also worth noting that when Rt =1 ,t h ev e l o c i t ys h o c kd o e sn o ta ﬀect the
households’ decision, since the cost of holding money will be zero.
2We denote by uj (t), the partial derivative of the function u(Ct,L t,κt) with respect to the
argument j = Ct,L t.
62.2. Government
The government has to ﬁnance an exogenous stream of government purchases,
Gt. These purchases result from the aggregation of the expenditures on each good










Given Gt and the prices on each good, Pt (i), the government chooses the quan-










The government ﬁnances Gt with lump sum taxes Tt = PtGt.T h e s e t a x e s a r e
collected at the goods market. In addition, the government makes a lump-sum
monetary transfer, Xt, to the households at the assets market.
As government debt is irrelevant in this environment, we choose to write the





t−1 + PtGt + Xt − Tt.




Each ﬁrm i has the production technology
yt (i) ≤ ztF (nt (i)), (2.12)
where yt (i) is the production of good i, nt (i) is the labor used in the production
of good i,a n dzt is an aggregate technology shock. Good i c a nb eu s e df o r
private and public consumption, yt (i)=ct (i)+gt (i). The proﬁts of ﬁrm i are
Πt (i)=Pt (i)yt (i) − Wtnt (i).
We will consider now the maximization problem of the ﬁrms in the two envi-
ronments, when ﬁrms can set prices contemporaneously and when prices have to
be set one period in advance.
72.3.1. Under ﬂexible prices
Under ﬂexible prices, ﬁrm i maximizes the value of period t proﬁts in units of










obtained from (2.6) and from (2.11), where Yt = Ct + Gt.







The ﬁrms set a common price, equal to a constant mark-up over marginal cost.
2.3.2. Under sticky prices
We consider now the environment where ﬁrms set prices one period in advance and
sell output on demand in period t at the previously chosen price. In this environ-
ment ﬁrm i solves the problem of choosing at t−1, the price Pt (i) that maximizes
the value of proﬁts, Et−1 [Qt−1,tQt,t+1Πt (i)], subject to (2.12) and (2.13). Using
(2.8), (2.9) and the law of iterated expectations, the objective function of this
problem can be rewritten as
Et−1
·µ








































All ﬁrms set the price equal to a mark-up over the expected value of a weighted
marginal cost.
82.4. Market clearing:
In each period there are markets for goods, labor, money, risk-free nominal bonds
and state contingent nominal securities. Market clearing conditions are given by
the following equations, for each date and state
ct (i)+gt (i)=yt (i),
so that the demand for each of the goods is equal to the supply,
Z 1
0
nt (i) di = Nt,








From the cash in advance constraints (2.4) of the households and the market





t−1 + Xt ≡ M
s
t . (2.17)
2.5. Imperfectly competitive equilibria
Equilibria in the two environments, ﬂexible prices and sticky prices, are deﬁned
as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.1. An equilibrium is a set of prices {(Pt (st),P t(i)(st),W t (st),Q t,t+1 (st+1),
Rt (st))i∈[0,1],s t∈St,st+1∈St+1}∞
t=0, allocations {(Yt (st),y t(i)(st),C t (st),c t(i)(st),N t (st),
nt(i)(st),M t (st),B t (st),A t+1 (st+1))i∈[0,1],s t∈St,s t+1∈St+1}∞
t=0, initial nominal wealth
W0, and policy variables
n




that: (i) Given the prices
n




9initial nominal wealth W0, and policy variables
©
(Xt (st),T t (st))st∈St
ª∞
t=0 the se-
quences {(Ct (st),c t(i)(st),N t (st),M t (st),B t (st),A t+1 (st+1))i∈[0,1],s t∈St,st+1∈St+1}∞
t=0
solve the problem of the representative household.
(ii) (a) In the environment with ﬂexible prices, given prices
©













the problem of the ﬁrms, as in Section 2.3.1.
( b )I nt h ee n v i r o n m e n tw i t hs t i c k yp r i c e s ,g i v e np r i c e s{(Pt (st),W t (st),Q t−1,t (st),
Qt,t+1 (st+1),R t (st))st∈St,st+1∈St+1}∞










, solves the problem of the ﬁrms, as in Section
2.3.2. In this environment the prices are such that Pt (st−1,s 0)=Pt (st−1,s 00) for
all st−1 ∈ St−1, and s0,s 00 ∈ St,a n dPt(i)(st−1,s 0)=Pt(i)(st−1,s 00) for all i ∈ [0,1],
st−1 ∈ St−1, and s0,s 00 ∈ St.
(iii) All markets clear.
In the following section we characterize the set of equilibria deﬁned above. In
particular, we discuss how the sets of equilibrium allocations can be implemented
using monetary policy in the two environments.
2.6. Implementable allocations under ﬂexible and under sticky prices
Under ﬂexible prices, for each path of the nominal interest rate there is a single
equilibrium allocation. The set of implementable allocations is the set of equilib-
rium allocations associated with the diﬀerent interest rate policy paths, {Rt},w i t h
Rt ≥ 1. This set can be described, for each date and state, by an intratemporal
marginal condition and the feasibility condition.
Under ﬂexible prices, the marginal condition of households, (2.7), and the price
setting condition, (2.14), can be combined as
uL(Ct,1 − Nt,κt)









vt . The level of the interest rate and the mark-up of the mo-
nopolistic competition aﬀect the allocation on the same margin. Both introduce
a wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate of
substitution. Given a path for the gross nominal interest rate, {Rt}, condition
(2.18) together with the feasibility constraint,
Ct + Gt = ztF (Nt), all t ≥ 0, s
t, (2.19)
10determines the ﬂexible price allocation {Ct,N t}, for each date and state.
It is straightforward to see that the optimal allocation is implemented by
setting the net interest rate equal to zero. With Rt =1 , the wedge is minimized
for each date and state, and expected utility is maximized.
Each allocation can be implemented by multiple paths for the money supply.
Thus the price level is not uniquely determined. This is the nature of the nominal
indeterminacy under ﬂexible prices. The price level and the money supply for each






t , all t ≥ 0, s
t,
and the intertemporal condition, (2.8),







,a l lt ≥ 1, s
t−1.
which, as stated, holds from period one on. At t =0 , there is one cash-in-advance
constraint to determine both the price level and the money supply.
If the number of states at t ≥ 1 is Φt, there are Φt+1 equations to determine 2Φt
variables, the time t price levels and money supplies. Thus, there is a continuum of
sequences for the money supply and for the price level that satisfy these equations.
For a given path of the price level, the nominal wage can be determined using
condition (2.7). In summary, under ﬂexible prices there is a single allocation
implemented by a particular sequence of the nominal interest rate and there are
multiple sequences for the money supply, the price level and the nominal wage
associated with that allocation.
It is important to note that there is one equilibrium price level sequence where
the price does not depend on the contemporaneous information. Given P0,i n
period 0 there is one equation to determine M0,a n di ne a c hp e r i o dt ≥ 1,t h e r e
are Φt+1equations to determine Φt+1variables, i.e., Φt money supplies and one
price level. When the money supply is set in this way, and if ﬁrms were restricted
to set prices in advance, that restriction would not be binding. This means that
the set of ﬂexible prices equilibrium allocations can be implemented under sticky
prices.
In contrast to what happens under ﬂexible prices, in the sticky price environ-
ment, for a given process of the nominal interest rate, there are multiple equilib-
rium allocations, each one associated with a diﬀerent process for the money supply.
11In the sticky price environment, the marginal condition of the households, (2.7),










=1 , all t ≥ 1, s
t−1, (2.20)
where ηt is given by (2.16). This condition restricts the average proportionate
wedge between the marginal rate of transformation and the marginal rate of sub-
stitution. It can be manipulated, together with the intertemporal condition, (2.8),












 =0 , all t ≥ 1, s
t−1. (2.21)
Given the nominal interest rate process, condition (2.21) together with (2.19)
determine the set of implementable allocations {Ct,N t}. Notice that for each date
there are more unknowns (2Φt) than equations (1+Φt). While there is a single
allocation under ﬂexible prices for a given path of the nominal interest rate, under
sticky prices there are multiple allocations that can be implemented. Each of those
allocations is implemented with a path for the money supply, {Mt}, t ≥ 0, ap a t h












, all t ≥ 1, s
t−1,
the cash-in-advance constraint, (2.4), and the households’ intratemporal condi-
tion, (2.7). The time 0 price level, P0, is exogenous.3
In summary, in both environments, for a given path of the nominal interest
rate, there is a continuum of money supply policies. Under sticky prices, each
of these policies is associated with a diﬀerent real allocation. This is the sense
in which Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998a) call attention to the real indeterminacy
associated with an interest rate policy under sticky prices. Our approach is very
diﬀerent, since we allow the planner to decide on the money supply and, therefore,
to use the degrees of freedom implied by (2.21) and (2.19) to achieve the optimal
allocation.
3Notice that the degrees of freedom are the same under sticky and ﬂexible prices. Under
ﬂexible prices there are Φt price setting conditions each period that are replaced by one under
sticky prices. However under sticky prices there is only one price level to determine in each
period.
123. Optimal allocations under sticky prices
In this section, we characterize the optimal allocations under commitment to
policy in the sticky price environment. These allocations maximize welfare in the
set of implementable allocations described above.
As mentioned above, under sticky prices it is possible to use the money supply
policy to replicate the set of allocations under ﬂexible prices. This is stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: The set of implementable allocations under sticky prices con-
tains the corresponding set under ﬂexible prices.4 Thus, the optimal allocation
under sticky prices makes the households at least as well oﬀ as under ﬂexible
prices.
Proof. This proposition is straightforward since for each interest rate path
{Rt}, the feasibility constraints are the same in two environments, and the im-
plementability condition under sticky prices, (2.21), is the expected value of the
constraints (2.18) of the ﬂexible prices environment.
The optimal ﬂexible price allocation will be the benchmark to which the opti-
mal allocation under sticky prices will be compared. As we will show, in general
the two optimal allocations do not coincide, so that it is not optimal to follow a
policy that eliminates gaps. Sticky prices allow the planner to choose an allocation
that is strictly better than the optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices.
The planner’s problem is to choose the sequences of consumption, Ct, labor,
Nt, and interest rate Rt, that maximize (2.1) subject to the feasibility constraint
(2.19), the implementability condition (2.21) and the condition that the gross
nominal interest rate is greater than or equal to one, Rt ≥ 1. The Lagrangian for

















t)(ztF(Nt) − Gt − Ct)
4This has been stated in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998a), even though the emphasis is on
policies where this possibility of targeting both the nominal interest rates and the price level is


























tϕt(st−1)Pr(st−1) are the multipliers of the resources con-
straint and the implementability condition, respectively, and Pr(st) is the proba-
bility of the history st.
In the next two subsections we analyze the planner’s problem. We do it in
two stages. We start by determining the optimal interest rate policy. We show
that it is necessary to follow the Friedman rule, of setting the nominal interest
rate to zero, in order to achieve the optimal allocation. The Friedman rule is
also optimal under ﬂexible prices. However, while under ﬂexible prices there is a
unique allocation for consumption and labor, under sticky prices there are multiple
implementable allocations. In Section 3.2, we characterize the optimal allocation
under sticky prices, and compare it to the optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices.
3.1. The optimal interest rate policy
The following proposition states the optimal interest rate policy,
Proposition 2: The optimal interest rate policy is the Friedman rule, i.e.
Rt =1 .
Proof. A marginal increase in the nominal interest rate has a negative impact











(Ct + Gt). (3.2)
Given the non-negativity constraint on the net nominal interest rate and the fact
that in this second best environment ϕt is always strictly positive, it is optimal to
set R0
t = Rt =1 .
The optimal interest rate path under ﬂexible prices coincides with the optimal
interest rate path in the sticky price environment. As we restricted the ﬁscal in-
struments to lump sum taxes, the planner does not need to rely on distortionary
taxes to ﬁnance public expenditures. Under ﬂexible prices, if the nominal interest
rate is set equal to its lower bound, the economy will be distorted by the monopo-
listic mark-up only. If the net nominal interest rate in any state is set higher than
zero, then this worsens the distortion in that state and reduces expected utility.
Under sticky prices, the wedge is not necessarily higher in that particular state.
14However, it is still optimal to set the interest rate equal to its lower bound since
otherwise the relevant average wedge is larger.
When the net nominal interest rate is zero, the level of real balances is inde-
terminate as the cash-in-advance constraint does not bind. Under ﬂexible prices
there is a unique equilibrium for consumption and labor. However, in a sticky
price environment, at the Friedman rule, for one money supply path there are
multiple equilibrium allocations. This is shown in a comment to Ireland (1996)
by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998b). The indeterminacy is no longer present for a
positive but arbitrarily small interest rate. It seems to us that all that is econom-
ically relevant is the behavior of these economies as the interest rate approaches
zero.5
3.2. Optimal policy for a given interest rate path
We pursue the analysis of the optimal money supply policy, taking as given a
constant nominal interest rate Rt, that is greater than, but arbitrarily close to,
one. In the limit R0
t is also equal to one for any velocity shock, vt. We characterize
the optimal wedges, i.e., the optimal deviation of the ratio of the marginal rate
of substitution to the marginal rate of transformation from the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l ,
uC(t)
uL(t)ztFN (t) − 1.U n d e r ﬂexible prices, when the nominal interest rate is one,
these wedges are constant and equal to the markup, θ
(θ−1) − 1. Under sticky
prices, the wedges are on average equal to that number, but can vary across
states. We investigate whether it is optimal to conduct policy so that the wedges
are constant. In other words, we want to establish whether it is optimal to use
non-neutral monetary policy under sticky prices to replicate the ﬂexible price
allocation, i.e. to close gaps.
The optimal allocation is the allocation that maximizes the utility in the set
deﬁned by the feasibility constraint, (2.19), and the implementability condition,




















5We thank Robert Lucas and V.V. Chari for discussions on this issue. The approach we
follow in this paper is normative. We do not model the game played by the government and



















FN(t) and $N(t) is the derivative of $(t) with respect to Nt.



























together with the implementability and the feasibility conditions, (2.19) and (2.21).
Notice that the left hand side of condition (3.5) is one plus the optimal markup.
We want to determine under which conditions on preferences, technology, and
shocks, the allocation with constant markups satisﬁes the optimality conditions.
We have seen that the constant markup allocation satisﬁes the feasibility and im-
plementability condition (Proposition 1). It remains to be checked whether that



















































is constant across states.6 The following lemma states this result.
6(3.6) can be written for the allocation under ﬂexible prices as ϕt =
θ
(θ−1)−1
Dt . At the optimal
allocation, Dt must be constant so that ϕt is constant across states. Notice that we can write
the optimal problem under ﬂexible prices as we wrote the problem under sticky prices, (3.1)
except that the multipliers are state dependent, ϕt(st). When the optimal multipliers in that
problem are constant across states, ϕt(st)=ϕt(st−1), i.e., when Dt is constant, then the two
optimal solutions coincide.
16Lemma 1: The ﬂexible price allocation satisﬁes the optimality conditions of
the planner’s problem under sticky prices iﬀ the expression (3.7) is constant across
states.
In the lemma and propositions that follow we establish that in general the
expression for Dt i sn o tc o n s t a n tf o rt h eﬂexible price allocation. Thus, in general
it is not optimal to set the wedges constant across states, or to replicate the
ﬂexible price allocation. We proceed in the following way: In Lemma 2 we assert
the irrelevance of velocity shocks. In Proposition 3 we state that if there are
no shocks to the share of government expenditures in the output, and if there
are no preference shocks or they are multiplicative, then for most preferences and
technologies used in the real business cycles literature, the ﬂexible price allocation
solves the planner’s problem marginal conditions. However, once government
expenditure shocks are considered the result is reversed. Thus in general the
ﬂexible price allocation is not optimal. This is stated in Proposition 4.
Lemma 2: Velocity shocks are irrelevant for the determination of the optimal
allocations.
Proof: Since the optimal interest rate is Rt = R0
t =1 ,t h e nv e l o c i t ys h o c k s
do not aﬀect the set of implementable allocations. They also do not aﬀect the
preferences directly.¥
Proposition 3: Let Gt = GYt, G ≥ 0, and κt = κ, or κt 6= κ, and
u(Ct,L t,κt) ≡ κtu(Ct,L t). The expression for Dt is constant for the ﬂexible
price allocation when






F(Lt), FL > 0, σ ≥ 0, σ 6=1 , (3.8)
which are preferences such that labor is constant across states in the ﬂexible price
allocation; or when
(ii) Preferences are described by monotonic transformations of additively sep-








t , σ ≥ 0, σ 6=1 , ψ ≥ 1, α > 0, (3.9)
and the technology is
F = γN
%
t , γ > 0,% ≤ 1.





ztFN(t), which can be rewritten, using the resources constraint, as













Yt = G, the labor allocations under ﬂexible prices are constant across states.
As Dt is invariant to monotonic transformations of the momentary utility (see












Since the labor allocation is constant, the elasticity of the marginal utility of labor,
uLL(t)Nt
uL(t) , is constant, and so are $N (t) and
$(t)
Nt .T h u s ,Dt is constant across states
when the share of expenditures in output is constant, Gt
Yt = G.
In case (ii), the labor allocation varies across states. However since the ad-
ditional assumptions of Cobb-Douglas production and constant elasticity of the
marginal utility of labor are made, the expression for Dt is still going to be con-










Yt = G and since
$(t)
Nt and $N (t) are constants for the Cobb-Douglas
production function, then Dt is constant across states. Notice that if σ =0 ,t h e n
Dt is constant even if there are shocks to the share of government expenditures.
Now we consider κt 6= κ, and u(Ct,L t,κt) ≡ κtu(Ct,L t). Since the shock
is multiplicative and there are no intertemporal production linkages, the ﬂexible
price allocation does not depend on κt. It is also immediate to see that Dt does not
depend directly on κt. Therefore Dt is constant for the preferences and technology
described in (i) and (ii).¥
The classes of preferences (i) and (ii) in Proposition 3 include preferences com-
monly used in macroeconomics. Class (i) includes preferences that are aggregable






, σ > 0,ψ > 0,
18or
u =l o gCt + αLt, α > 0. (3.10)
This second utility function, (3.10), is the one assumed in Ireland (1996). He
does not consider government expenditure shocks, so that in his environment
the ﬂexible price allocation is optimal. The class (ii) of preferences includes the









, ξ ≥ 0, ψ > 1, α > 0. (3.11)
These preferences correspond to the case where σ =0 ,s ot h a tDt is constant even
if there are shocks to the share of government expenditures.
We now provide a simple example of aggregable preferences, outside of classes
(i) and (ii) in Proposition 3, where, under the conditions in that proposition,
the ﬂexible price allocation is not optimal. Consider preferences described by
u = αCt +( Lt)
1
2 and technology such that FN =1 . Then, Dt = 1
2Lt. Since in the
ﬂexible price allocation Lt depends on the state, Dt is state dependent. The sticky
price optimal allocation achieves higher utility than the ﬂexible price allocation
does. For the parametrization of two equally probable i.i.d. shocks, S = {1,2},
with α =2 , and θ =2 ,t h eﬂexible price allocation is given by Ct =1 .875 in the
good state and Ct = .75 in the bad state. The pair of consumptions, 1.845 in
the good state and .834 in the bad state, satisﬁes the conditions of the planner’s
problem and gives a higher expected utility to the representative agent. In this
particular case the social planner prefers a smoother output allocation to the
ﬂexible prices one.
So far we have assumed that government expenditures are colinear with the
output. As was clear from the proof in Proposition 3, that is a necessary condition
for the ﬂexible price allocation to be optimal for the preferences and technologies
identiﬁed in that proposition, except when σ =0in case (ii). This is stated in
the following corollary.
Corollary: For the classes of preferences and technologies described in Propo-
sition 3, except when σ =0in case (ii), if Gt
ztF(Nt) is state dependent for the ﬂexible
price allocation, then Dt is not constant across states. Thus, the optimal allocation
u n d e rs t i c k yp r i c e si sd i ﬀerent from the optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices,
and provides higher welfare.
Proof: It is easy to verify that Dt i sn o tc o n s t a n tw h e n Gt
ztF(Nt) varies across
states for the ﬂexible price allocation. For preferences i), Nt in the ﬂexible price
19allocation is now state dependent and Dt depends both on Nt and on Gt
ztF(Nt).F o r
preferences and technology ii) with σ 6=0 , Dt depends only on Gt
ztF(Nt) and since
this ratio is state dependent, Dt is also state dependent.¥
As stated in this corollary, if the share of government expenditures in output is
not constant, the optimal solution under sticky prices will in general diﬀer from the
ﬂexible price one. Since there is no reason to restrict government expenditures to
be a constant share of output, we claim that in general the two optimal solutions
are diﬀerent. Since the ﬂexible price allocation is implementable under sticky
prices, it must be the case that the optimal policy under sticky prices dominates,
in welfare terms, the optimal policy under ﬂexible prices. Thus, sticky prices allow
the planner to improve upon the optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices.
We have analyzed an economy without capital. Allowing for capital accumu-
lation should reinforce the result, that the optimal allocations in the two environ-
ments diﬀer. We conjecture that this result holds whenever the share of any com-
ponent of aggregate demand varies across states. Since in a business cycle model
with capital, the investment share in the output reacts to technological shocks,
we have additional reasons to infer that the optimal allocation under sticky prices
provides higher utility than the optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices.
In this section we have been assuming that the cash-in-advance constraint is
binding. A positive nominal interest rate guarantees that. However when the
nominal interest rate is zero, as is the case at the optimum, it is not possible to
determine the allocations using money supply. For this reason, at the Friedman
rule we can only claim that there is one allocation under sticky prices that domi-
nates in welfare terms the optimal allocation under ﬂexible prices. By a continuity
argument, however it is still the case that, under sticky prices, there is a mone-
tary policy that dominates the policy that eliminates gaps. There is a suﬃciently
small interest rate such that the optimal allocation under sticky prices can be
determined using the money supply, and that optimal allocation provides higher
utility than the optimal ﬂexible price allocation at the Friedman rule.
We have chosen to identify the issue of the optimal monetary policy under
sticky prices with the issue of whether the ﬂexible price allocation is optimal.
Since the ﬂexible price allocation is characterized by constant markups, the analy-
sis was centered on the conditions under which it is optimal to set the markups
constant across states. For this reason there is a resemblance between the prob-
lem we analyzed and the one of determining whether taxes should be uniform in
the Ramsey problem under ﬂexible prices, where the government must ﬁnance
20exogenous government expenditures with distortionary taxes.7 In one problem
the government can use monetary policy to aﬀect the markups across states while
keeping some average of these markups constant, which is imposed by the consis-
tency of the price setting decisions of ﬁrms. In the other problem the government
can choose the taxes across states, and time, for a given average of these tax rates
that satisﬁes the budget constraint. The results in both problems are also similar.
In particular it is the case that for the utility function (3.8), and for (3.9) with
Cobb-Douglas technology, it is optimal to set uniform taxes. However because the
two problems are in fact diﬀerent, the results are also diﬀerent. On one hand the
uniform taxation result holds for preferences (3.9) and Cobb-Douglas technology
whatever is the process of government expenditures. On the other hand the result
does not hold for monotonic transformations of the utility functions, and thus for
the (3.11) preferences when ξ 6=0 .8
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we focus on optimal cyclical monetary policy. We analyze a simple
environment with short run non-neutrality of money and determine principles for
the conduct of the monetary policy as stabilization policy.
The main result of the paper is that the optimal allocation under sticky prices
is in general diﬀerent from the optimal one under ﬂexible prices. It also provides
higher welfare, since the ﬂexible price allocation is achievable under sticky prices.
Thus, a simple welfare criterion of eliminating gaps is not optimal. We also show
that, as under ﬂexible prices, the Friedman rule must be followed in order to
achieve the optimal allocation.
In the economies without capital that we analyze, if there were only techno-
logical shocks, velocity shocks, and multiplicative shocks to preferences, then, for
most preferences and technology structures used in the real business cycles liter-
ature, it would be optimal to replicate the ﬂexible price allocation, eliminating
the distortions arising from sticky prices. Under the optimal zero nominal interest
rate policy, the only remaining distortion would be the constant mark-up resulting
from monopolistic competition. This is not a general result, though. When shocks
to government expenditures are considered, the result is reversed. In general, it
is no longer the case that the optimal allocations under ﬂexible and sticky prices
7See Goodfriend and King (2000)
8See Correia, Nicolini and Teles (2000)
21coincide. This means that it is optimal to set varying ex-post mark-ups across
states.
The optimal solution under sticky prices, characterized both by the Friedman
rule and by variable ex-post markups, cannot be decentralized in the environment
with ﬂexible prices, because under ﬂexible prices monetary policy can only aﬀect
the wedges through the nominal interest rates and these are bounded away from
zero. Under sticky prices it is possible to overcome that restriction by using the
short run non neutrality of monetary policy.
Our results on the optimality of constant proportionate wedges resemble results
in the optimal taxation literature on the optimality of uniform taxation. As in
the taxation problem the optimal allocations are in general not characterized by
constant proportionate wedges. However, again as in that problem, it may be the
case that quantitatively the optimal allocation and the one with constant wedges
do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
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